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the cortical module of cognition: a discrete and continu-The Module: Crisis of a Paradigm
ous piece of cortical tissue specialized to serve one
cognitive function or to represent one essential aspect
of the information processed by it. Many such modulesThe New Cognitive Neurosciences, Second Edition
working together would make and explain the mind.Michael S. Gazzaniga, Editor-in-Chief
That concept is not only present in the sections onCambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (1999).
sensory and motor systems, where it finds a most natural1419 pp., $129.95.
context, but in chapters dealing with higher cognitive
functions, notably perception, memory, and language.
The word ªmoduleº may not be used, but the conceptIf Aristotle had been able to commission a select group
is there in various other semantic garbsÐe.g., column,of twentieth century neuroscientists to do another edi-
area, network, domainÐwith a wide range of assumedtion of De Anima (arguably Thomas Aquinas already did
anatomical dimensions.the second and Juan Luis Vives the third), the product
The concept of cortical modules originated in physiol-would probably look much like this tome. Admittedly
ogy. More than four decades ago it was discovered that,my conceptual leap is based on an overstretch of natural
in primary sensory and motor cortices, all the compo-philosophy, but I think comes close to characterizing in
nent units of certain discrete, often vertical, neuronala nutshell the essence of what is right with this ªopus,º
aggregates had a common function, namely, to repre-and what is not.
sent an elementary sensory or motor feature. This find-Cognitive neuroscience is not a new field, though its
ing appeared to give a role to the columns of nerveprecise origin is difficult to trace. It was born whenever
cells that had been anatomically identified long beforeand wherever scientists began to ponder the logical
in those cortices. It firmly established those cellular ag-relations between brain and mind and to explore those
gregates as elementary modules of cortical function forrelations by observation and experiment. Most certainly,
both sensation and movement. More recent neuroanat-it was not born in Squaw Valley, California, where in the
omy also revealed that as axonal pathways depart fromsummer of 1993 a group of neuroscientists met to give
sensory cortices toward higher associative areas, theyit a name and to give themselves an agenda. The field
adopt certain patterns of divergence and convergence,was not born there any more than man's search for gold
was born in 1848 at Sutter's Mill, some 50 miles from
where they met, where the California gold rush got
started.
The agenda was to produce a comprehensive and
unified treatise on ªthe cognitive neurosciences.º With
the first edition (1995), and now again with this one
(Figure 1), the tour de force has succeeded almost com-
pletely on both counts, breadth and unity. The result is
an encyclopedic achievement unquestionably suited for
students to visit, if not to purchase or carry around (it
doesn't fit either the budget or the backpack of any I
know). The treatise has achieved a degree of conceptual
harmony too, although I am afraid some of the harmoniz-
ing concepts are of questionable value at the gate of
this millennium. On this score, the second edition does
not do better than the first, despite the addition of a
new adjective to the title, ªnew.º
All of neuroscience is ªcognitive.º The study of molec-
ular and cellular mechanisms qualifies as cognitive sci-
ence inasmuch as these mechanisms mediate the pro-
cessing of information in the service of any cognitive
function. This was undoubtedly in the mind of the orga-
nizers as they opened the purview of their volume to a
wide variety of neuroscientific topics and methods. Their
purpose in so doing, however, was surely not to produce
a juxtaposition of disconnected fine chapters on each
of the topics. Rather, they presumably wanted the all-
encompassing coverage to support their main agenda,
which was the cognitive science of the cerebral cortex.
That extended coverage diluted the agenda, but not
Figure 1. The Book Cover from The New Cognitive Neurosciencesenough to obscure a central concept that appears in
various forms in many of the chapters. That concept is Reprinted with permission from MIT Press.
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possibly to innervate higher and more complex modules, on his way home, looks for it assiduously around the
lamppost, ªbecause here there's light.º Despite thewhich would integrate simple features into complex cat-
egories of perception. Further, cells in those areas ªdouble dissociationsº of lesion studies, which are rare,
or the variations of stimulation and mapping parametersseemed to encode more complex sensory stimuli than
those in primary cortex. The conceptual framework was of microelectrode studies, which are rarely exhaustive,
the reader of those studies is often left with unansweredthus laid out for a hierarchical organization of ever more
complex modulesÐwith increasingly larger columnar questions about other cortical areas, other layers, other
tasks, other stimuli, etc. In cognitive neuroscience, noarrangementsÐto accommodate ever higher aspects of
cognition. one has yet solved the core problem of Francis Bacon's
inductive method of scientific inquiry, which we all faith-In the higher levels of that theoretical edifice, anato-
mists and physiologists met neuropsychologists, who fully follow; somewhere after all, there may be a black
swan, or a gray one.were eager to localize in the brain their own constructs
of cognitive functionÐmostly derived from studies of the Another source of confusion, no less common, is to
infer the absolute or categorical function of a brain struc-effects of cortical damage. The result of the intellectual
alliance of those three groups of scientists was, in the ture from relative differences of some sort. Function fa
is more affected than function fb by lesion of area A,humble opinion of this reviewer, something not too dis-
tant from a new phrenology more or less legitimized by ergo area A is the center, focus, domain, or module of
function fa. The neurons of area C are more active inthe scientific method. One of my purposes in this review
is to caution the reader about some of the problems function fc than in function fd, ergo area C is the center,
focus, domain, or module of function fc. The weaknesswith the neuromodular principle of cognition and the
methods used to support it. Another is to point out of these arguments is obvious. In the imaging literature,
however, that weakness is often disguised in subtractivethe pressing need for a more apt and useful model of
cognitive organization in the cortex. images. Here, the error may be compounded by more
or less arbitrary adjustments of the threshold of intensityThere is no greater impediment to a unified cognitive
neuroscience than our inveterate Aristotelian tendency or extensity of ªactivation.º The categorizing-from-dif-
ference and the threshold manipulation, in addition toto consider cognitive functions as separate entities. For
more than a century, experimental psychologists have intersubject variance, give rise to implausible images
of circumscribed activation pretending to illustrate abeen successfully dissecting them. It should be obvious,
however, that the success in defining, classifying, and cortical module for what should be a widely distributed
cortical function, such as memoryÐworking or not. Ifexperimentally manipulating any given cognitive func-
tion does not imply a separate neural structure for it. we add to all that the imponderables of inhibition and
of neural±hemodynamic coupling, we are faced with aCommon sense, psychophysics, and experimental psy-
chology provide ample evidence that all cognitive func- perplexing situation.
Most of the authors appear to see these problems.tions are interdependent. Perception depends on mem-
ory and attention, memory depends on perception, This is the reason why, by and large, they limit their
conclusions to their individual methodology and subjectlanguage depends on all three, intelligence is served
by all of the above plus reasoning, and so on. Also of inquiry. Those who draw their conclusions with a
modular model in mind generally couch them in probabi-interdependent must be, of course, their neural founda-
tions. listic terms and with qualifiers. In so doing, however,
they oftentimes reveal their hesitancy or outright impa-Electrophysiology and human imaging increasingly
support a common substrate for all cognitive functions, tience with the model. They appear conceptually caught
between two opposite reductionistic currents, neitherhowever spread out or ªdistributedº on the surface of
the cortex. Cortical lesions rarely if ever affect only one of which leads to the common goal of this scholarly
enterprise: the downward reductionism toward cellularcognitive function. An agnosia, for example, is as much
a deficit of perception as it is of memory and of language. and molecular mechanisms that are basic to cognition
but define none of it, and the upward reductionism to-Yet in this book several authors, on whatever grounds,
follow the long tradition of ascribing different cognitive ward synthetic modules that seem to elude almost ev-
erybody and, when found, convince nobody. Rakic, inoperations or contents to different cortical areas. Thus,
they allocate an anatomical ªmoduleº to one or another his introduction, cogently reflects on the dilemma.
The hesitancy and impatience of some of the authorscognitive function or specific item of cognition (e.g., a
memory system, a perceptual category, retrieval, spatial with the cognitive module reveal the current intellectual
malaise of a vast sector of the neuroscience communityinformation, working memory, syntax, faces, names).
Such inferences are informed not only by the effects of in its search for a solution to the mind/brain problem.
The modular principle of neurocognition is under stresscortical lesions but by the physiology of primary corti-
ces, especially if sensory stimuli have been used to test and the book shows it. This book is, indeed, a monumen-
tal ªrecueilº of inductive and deductive neurosciencethe cognitive function in question. Often, however, the
evidence behind the inferences is weak at the root be- for anyone to use and admire. Much of it also is, in my
opinion, a monument to a vanishing vision of the cerebralcause of certain methodological errors that tarnish sev-
eral of the studies or their precursors. cortex.
At the risk of sounding grandiose, I dare say we areOne of those errors, which we all commit at one time
or another, is to constrain a cognitive function within witnessing a classic crisis of scientific paradigm (Kuhn,
1996). Here, the paradigm in crisis resulted in no smallthe scope of the method used to test it, or the cortical
lesion that impairs it. Sometimes, when I see it, the error measure from an overextension of the modular reality
of sensory physiology (ªthe gate to perceptionº) and isreminds me of the drunkard who, having lost the key
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sustained by attempts to ªmodularizeº the neural sub- them.) Cognitive information emerges irreducibly from
strate of the mind. We are also witnessing the harbingers relationships that are probably far from linear; nowhere
of a new paradigm, which makes a welcome appearance but in the cortex is it more true that the whole is more
in several chapters of this book. I shall mention only a than the sum of its parts. Practically any cortical neuron
few. The network paradigm appears in the chapter by or neuronal assembly, or module, can be part of many
Singer, where perceptual information is based on a dis- networks, and thus many percepts, items of memory,
tributed cortical network, as in a large cell assembly aÁ or knowledge. A network can serve several cognitive
la Hebb, though the electrical code of that information functions, which consist of neuronal interactions within
is far from established. LaBerge presents a large-scale and between cortical networks. Because networks are
cortical network, which would not only contain cognitive made of associations, any of them may be activated and
information but support one particular cognitive function set into function by the activation of any of its associated
to integrate it, attention. Martin et al., by neuroimaging, neuronal constituents. Elsewhere (Fuster, 1995), I dis-
substantiate a categorizing network of cortical cell pop- cuss these points in more detail.
ulations. Other less direct references to the network It is to be expected that in the future these ideas will
model can be found in the chapters by McCarthy with gain greater presence than they now have in cognitive
regard to face recognition, Middlebrooks with regard to neuroscience and in compilations such as this one. The
sound localization, Markowitsch with regard to memory, old paradigm will recede and the new one will take its
and Saffran et al. with regard to language. place. Under one paradigm or another, however, neuro-
The network model of neurocognition has been long science will continue to make steady progress on all
in the making. It originated in Gestalt psychology. For fronts. Galileo said that scientists like to fly alone, as
good reasons, few ever had much use for the neural the eagles do. Each is engaged in a private enterprise
concepts of Gestalt. Its central notion, however, has driven by inductive and deductive logic, pride, dedica-
shown lasting value and is directly relevant to cognitive tion, curiosity, and a keen eye for the unexpected. This
neuroscience today. It is the notion that perception and book contains magnificent examples of such enter-
other cognitive functions are based on an associational prises. Through a wealth of those private efforts, the
code, and the brain uses that code for categorizing inter- cognitive neurosciences will continue to advance as all
nal and external events. Hayek, an economist (Nobel, sciences always do, mostly by self-organization and
1974) familiar with both Gestalt and the neuroscience of without editors; like evolution, like society, like the econ-
his time, was the first to formulate a large-scale network omy of nations, like the cognitive networks of the cere-
model of cortical cognition in his Sensory Order (1952). bral cortex.
There, before the richness of cortical connectivity in
the primate became known, Hayek postulated extensive JoaquõÂn M. Fuster
nets of interconnected cortical neurons (he called them University of California, Los Angeles
ªmapsº) that represent percepts and actions in their Neuropsychiatric Institute
topological patterns of connection betweenÐnot inÐ Los Angeles, California 90095
neuronal assemblies; hence the relational code of neu-
ronal networks, a concept that others have subse- References
quently developed independently. It is essentially the
Fuster, J.M. (1995). Memory in the Cerebral Cortex (Cambridge, MA:same concept that originated in the fields of cognitive
MIT Press).and computer science and gave rise to connectionism.
Hayek, F.A. (1952). The Sensory Order (Chicago: University of Chi-For a long time the concept has remained out of the
cago Press).mainstream of neuroscience, mainly because it is diffi-
Kuhn, T.S. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:cult to substantiate experimentally. The use of several
University of Chicago Press).methods, especially in combination, is beginning to do
it, however: reversible lesion, field-potential recording,
microelectrode recording, fMRI, magnetic recording,
and computational network modeling.
Because the network paradigm is largely absent in
the book (though the term ªnetworkº is widely used), I
believe it is appropriate to summarize its principal fea-
tures, especially as they distinguish it from the modular
one. Cognitive information is represented in profusely
interconnected and overlapping neuronal networks of
the neocortex that transcend areas and modules by any
anatomical definition. The networks' specificity derives
essentially from the connections between elementary
units (neuron assemblies or modules) that are discontig-
uousÐi.e., not adjacentÐand dispersed throughout the
cortex; thus, that specificity stems not so much from
the neuronal constituents of the network as from the
relationships between them. (The notion of a ªnetwork
of modules,º as implied by some of the authors, still
places the burden of cognitive information on the mod-
ule or sum of modules, instead of the relations between
